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Euroscepticism is now a powerful force for the radical right
– and UKIP is well placed to harness it
UKIP has watched as its competitors on the mainstream and radical right have exited the
electoral field. Robert Ford writes that previously Conservative-voting ‘strategic
Eurosceptics’ along with the BNP’s ‘polite xenophobes’ have joined UKIP’s ranks giving Nigel
Farage and his party an unprecedented political opportunity.
Radical right parties mobilise a complex mix of  resentments, against immigration and
multiculturalism, corrupt and self -serving elites, a liberal popular culture and the lax morals
it tolerates, and the decline of  national culture and national sovereignty.  A growing number
of  parties across Europe have mobilised this heady, emotive mix of  identity, anxiety and intolerance to
break through into national polit ical representation, and even into government.Over the past decade,
Europe has become more closely entwined with f our of  the central concerns of  the radical right.
Nationalist concerns about the loss of  sovereignty to Europe have grown as evidence of  the power of
EU institutions, and popular rejection of  that power, have accumulated. Authoritarian voters, concerned
about maintaining law and order and protecting society f rom threats have seen Brit ish governments
losing battles with European institutions, particularly the European Court of  Human Rights, over issues
such as votes f or prisoners and deportation of  criminals.
Voters anxious about immigration see Europe looming larger too. Since the accession of  the poorer
post-Communist “A8″ countries in 2004, and the decision by the Blair government to accept unrestricted
migration f rom these countries, central and Eastern Europe have become the principle source of
unskilled labour migration to Britain. Populists mobilising hostility to immigration can say, with
justif ication, that such migration can only be controlled by changing our relationship to Europe.
Europe has also emerged as a stronger theme in populist narratives railing against out of  touch self -
serving polit ical elites. Populists can point to the f rustration of  public opinion in the repeated ref usal of
both Labour and the Conservatives to of f er the public a ref erendum on Europe, or to seriously consider
proposals f or any f undamental ref orm of  relationships with the European Union. They can also point to
the prominence in EU polit ics of  senior polit ical f igures f rom both governing parties as evidence of  an
elite clique maintaining self -serving links with the lucrative and powerf ul Brussels gravy train.
In short, over the past decade it has become much easier f or radical right polit icians to argue that
Europe is “the problem”; the source of  immigration threatening Brit ish jobs and cultural identity, the
source of  judicial rulings protecting terrorists and criminals who threaten Brit ish saf ety, the source of  a
corrupt and self -serving elite polit ical culture, and the source of  endless rules and legislation limiting
Brit ish sovereignty and threatening Brit ish identity.
Europe also plays a second, subtler role f or populist right wing polit icians – it helps to legit imate them.
Research suggests that many voters are internally conf licted about sensit ive polit ical issues, such as
Islam, immigration and identity – they may have strong concerns about these issues, but reject
organisations like the BNP and EDL due to their association with violence, racism or f ascism. Voters such
as this will reject parties, such as the Brit ish National Party, which are perceived purely as vehicles f or
mobilising intolerance. The most successf ul radical right polit icians are of ten, paradoxically, those who
start by talking about something else.
The contrasting treatment of  BNP leader Nick Grif f in and UKIP leader Nigel Farage over the past decade
provides an example of  this ef f ect in action. Grif f in’s ef f orts to appeal to a more mainstream audience
were hamstrung by his party’s legacy of  f ascism and violence, which lead the media, other polit icians, and
the electorate to treat him as a pariah. Nigel Farage, by contrast, has been able to raise similar
contentious questions about immigration, Islam and identity in mainstream polit ical f orums such as
Question Time without being attacked as a racist or a f ascist thanks to his roots in a more legit imate
tradit ion of  Eurosceptic polit ics.
My research with Matthew Goodwin and David Cutts suggests that UKIP have already been successf ul at
mobilising beyond its core issue of  Euroscepticism, developing an “uneasy coalit ion” of  two distinct
electorates. “Strategic Eurosceptics” are older alienated Conservatives supporting UKIP as a means to
express dissatisf action with the mainstream status quo over Europe. “Polite xenophobes” are more
economically insecure, working class voters who hold strongly populist views on a range of  issues –
including hostility to immigrants, anxiety about Islam and disaf f ection with mainstream polit ics – and who
regard UKIP as an outlet f or these views.
As the chart below shows, the attitudes of  UKIP voters in the 2009 European Parliament elections f ell
squarely between the Conservatives and the BNP on core radical right issues: xenophobic hostility to
immigrants, populist hostility to elites and racial prejudice against minorit ies. UKIP’s “core” voters (UKIPc)
– who expressed an intent to support the party in Westminster elections as well as Strasbourg elections
– expressed populist views even more strongly that “strategic” voters (UKIPs) who said they would
support the party in European elections.
Figure 1: Att itudes of Conservative, UKIP and BNP voters in the 2009 European Parliament
elections on four scales. Source: YouGov European Parliament poll, 2009
Recent polit ical events have reduced the competit ion UKIP f aces in building a “populist Eurosceptic”
support base. The collapse of  the BNP means UKIP now f aces no competitor on the extreme right,
leaving it f ree to recruit heavily f rom the 20 per cent of  the electorate who hold radical right views on a
broad range of  issues. In recent local elections some of  UKIP’s strongest perf ormances have come in
areas where the BNP has recently collapsed, suggesting it is already reaping these benef its. The
constraints the Conservatives f ace in coalit ion also leaves UKIP with more f reedom to recruit f rom the
centre-right on Europe but also on radical right issues such as law and order or immigration, and populist
resentment of  an out of  touch governing class of  “posh boys”.
UKIP still f aces f ormidable obstacles – such as balancing the demands of  EU f ocussed activists and
domestically f ocussed voters, and f inding a way to break through the barriers presented by the f irst past
the post electoral system used in local and Westminster elections. Despite this, Nigel Farage’s party has
an unprecedented opportunity, f or at the very moment when its core issue of  Europe has become
intertwined with broader radical right domestic concerns over identity, security, and immigration, UKIP’s
main competitors on the mainstream and radical right have vacated the f ield.
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